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Introduction
Statistics that measure labor market activity,
such as employment and unemployment, are
often interpreted in the press and by politicians
as measures of economic performance and
social well-being. Discussions that focus on
cross-country comparisons of unemployment,
for example, seem to be based without excep-
tion on the premise that unemployment repre-
sents a social and economic ill, so that less of it
is generally to be preferred. The purpose of this
note is to demonstrate that some care should
be exercised when constructing a map between
labor market behavior and economic welfare
and that, generally speaking, such interpreta-
tions are not justified in the absence of infor-
mation concerning the economic circumstances
that determine individual labor market choices.
I. Some Labor 
Market Facts
Each month, the Current Population Survey
(CPS) assigns the noninstitutional civilian popu-
lation of the United States to one of three mutu-
ally exclusive groups: Employment, Unemploy-
ment, or Nonparticipation. The survey begins
by determining whether a person is employed,
which is defined roughly as having allocated
any time at all toward paid work in the previ-
ous week. Those that are not employed in this
sense are defined as nonemployed. The survey
then asks all nonemployed individuals a series
of questions designed to detect some minimum
level of active job search. Those nonemployed
individuals that report themselves as having
engaged in some minimum level of active job
search over the previous week are classified as
unemployed.1 The remaining group of nonem-
ployed individuals are classified residually as
nonparticipants.
Of course, these three classifications are
extremely crude. We know, for example, that
there is a tremendous amount of variation in
hours worked per month across employed
individuals. While it is unclear how much time
is typically devoted to job search activities, we
can safely assume it varies from a few hours
per month browsing over help-wanted ads 
n 1 Individuals who report themselves on temporary layoff are also
classified as unemployed whether or not they report any search activity. It
should be pointed out, however, that these individuals form only a small
fraction of the total number of unemployed.
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to many hours per month seeking out job op-
portunities that are well-matched to an individ-
ual’s attributes.
Concerning the curious category of unem-
ployment, it seems apparent that the CPS (and,
indeed, most people) implicitly attaches a great
deal of weight to the time used for job search
by the nonemployed. Despite the popularity of
the unemployment measure among commen-
tators and policymakers, many economists
question the usefulness of the concept of
unemployment, preferring instead to focus on
employment (or nonemployment) and on the
allocation of time across other activities, for
example, on-the-job search, learning, and
household production. It is also interesting to
note that many extensive time-use studies,
such as those surveyed in Juster and Stafford
(1991), do not even include a category for job
search, let alone job search conducted by non-
employed individuals. Ultimately, the justifica-
tion for isolating job search as a crucial activity
distinct from the many other competing uses of
time among the nonemployed has to be based
on the theoretical and empirical relevance of
the concept.
Abstracting from seasonal variation, the CPS
reveals that net monthly changes in employ-
ment and unemployment tend to be relatively
small. However, the stability displayed by these
stocks masks the very high degree of turnover
that exists in the labor market: Each month, lit-
erally millions of individuals make transitions
between different labor market states. Histori-
cally, about 2 percent of the adult workforce in
the United States flows into and out of employ-
ment every month.2 Based on current popula-
tion estimates, this represents approximately 
4 million workers either losing or leaving their
jobs, and roughly the same number acquiring
jobs, resulting in a total turnover of about 8 mil-
lion workers per month.3
A second striking feature of the CPS flows
data concerns the degree of mobility displayed
by the group of individuals labeled “nonpartici-
pants.” Contrary to what one might expect,
fully half of the flows into and out of employ-
ment are accounted for by individuals making
transitions to and from nonparticipation. While
nonparticipants are, by definition, not “actively”
seeking employment opportunities, this appar-
ently does not preclude the possibility of being
available for employment (for example, if
called on by a former employer). This feature
of labor market behavior calls into question the
usefulness of attempting to make a distinction
between unemployment and nonparticipation.
However, the absolute size of the flows between
employment and unemployment are as large as
those that occur between employment and non-
participation. This, together with the fact that
the unemployment stock is much smaller than
the stock of nonparticipants, implies that the
average probability that an unemployed person
makes a transition to employment is much
higher than the corresponding probability for a
nonparticipant. This feature of the data is con-
sistent with the notion that unemployment is a
labor market state that facilitates the job-finding
process, an interpretation that conflicts with the
common textbook perception that “unemploy-
ment represents wasted resources.”4
The remainder of this paper is concerned
with developing a simple theoretical framework
that might be used to interpret the labor market
behavior described above; this interpretive
device is then used to determine under what
conditions changes in employment and unem-
ployment can be associated with changes in
economic welfare. The analysis proceeds in
two steps. First, a basic model of employment–
nonemployment is developed and analyzed.
This model is then extended to incorporate the
phenomenon of unemployment.
II. A Simple Model
of Worker Turnover
Consider an economy consisting of a fixed num-
ber of individuals. Each person has preferences
given at each point in time by U = ln(c) + z,
where c represents the consumption of market
goods and services and z represents the con-
sumption of services produced in the nonmar-
ket sector.5 Notice that according to this specifi-
cation of preferences, individuals find it very
painful to subsist at very low levels of market
consumption; i.e., U ® – ¥ as c ® 0.
Each person is endowed with an indivisible
unit of discretionary time, which may be uti-
lized either in the production of market goods
or services (employment) or in some other
activity (nonemployment). People generally dif-
fer in how their time is valued across alterna-
tive uses. Below, we interpret this heterogene-
ity as emanating from differences in individual
n 2 See Blanchard (1997, p. 295).
n 3 These figures actually underestimate the degree of turnover, as
they abstract from job-to-job transitions.
n 4 Mankiw (1994, p. 137).
n 5 The structure of the economy will be such that myopic decision-
making is optimal.
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economic circumstances as summarized by the
triplet (w, a, v). Here, w represents the market
value of an individual’s particular skill (real
wage) or, equivalently, the amount of output
that can be produced with one unit of labor
(productivity). The parameter a represents an
individual’s nonlabor income, for example,
interest income on property, income from a
spouse, unemployment insurance, or welfare,
charity, and so on. The parameter v represents
the value of time allocated to nonmarket activi-
ties, for example, home production or leisure.
Generally, we shall think of each of these para-
meters as differing across individuals at any
given point in time as well as changing periodi-
cally over time for any one person.6
We are interested in modeling an environ-
ment where individual labor market transitions
are associated with changes in economic well-
being, as is likely the case in reality. For this to
be true, financial markets must to some extent
be incomplete, since otherwise individuals
could insure themselves perfectly against any
idiosyncratic labor market risk. For simplicity,
we assume an extreme form of incompleteness
and abstract from financial markets entirely.
In the absence of financial markets, each
person faces a simple set of period budget con-
straints: c £ wn + a and z £ v(1 – n), where n
Î {0,1} represents the time allocation decision.
An individual facing economic circumstances
(w, a, v) must choose how to best allocate time
between employment and nonemployment.
The utility payoff associated with employment
(n =1) is given by ln(w + a), while the utility
payoff associated with nonemployment (n = 0)
is given by ln(a) + v. Clearly, the individual
should choose the action that yields the highest
utility payoff.
For a given configuration of (a, v), one can
define a reservation wage wR such that any per-
son with an employment opportunity w  ³ wR
will choose to work, while any person with an
employment opportunity  w < wR will choose
some nonmarket activity. The reservation wage
is defined to be that wage for which an individ-
ual is just indifferent between working or not;
i.e., wR satisfies:
(1) ln(wR + a) = ln(a) + v,
which can be solved explicitly as wR = (ev – 1)a.
Figure 1 plots the reservation wage as a func-
tion of v, holding fixed the level of nonlabor
income a.
The reservation wage has a very useful eco-
nomic interpretation. In particular, it can be
thought of as representing a person’s level of
“choosiness” over available job opportunities: A
higher reservation wage means that a person is
more discriminating. Theory sensibly suggests
that a person’s level of job-choosiness should
depend positively on the level of nonlabor
income and on the quality of opportunities in
the nonmarket sector. People are more discrim-
inating when they can afford to be. Figure 2
n 6 In order to maintain the optimality of myopic decision-making,
assume that (w, a, v) are identically and independently distributed random
variables.
F I G U R E 1
The Work Decision
F I G U R E 2
The Effect of Nonlabor Income
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plots the reservation wage function for two dif-
ferent levels of nonlabor income aH > aL.
With the reservation wage so defined, the
optimal time allocation decision is given by
(see figure 1):
(2) n(w, a, v) =  5
with maximum utility given by: 
(3) W(w, a, v) = max{ln(w + a), ln(a) + v }.
Theory suggests that an individual is more
likely to be employed when w (the return to
working) is high, and less likely to be employed
when either a or v are high (as these latter vari-
ables increase the reservation wage). The wel-
fare function W (also referred to as the indirect
utility function) tells us that individual well-
being is an increasing function of nonlabor
income and a nondecreasing function of both
the real wage and the value of time in the non-
market sector. All of this makes perfect sense. 
It also implies that there is no necessary correla-
tion between employment status and economic
well-being.
This assertion holds true at the aggregate
level as well. For a theory of aggregate employ-
ment, one must describe how the economic
attributes (w, a, v) are distributed over individu-
als. Let g(w, a, v) denote the fraction of the
population with attributes (w, a, v). Then
aggregate employment is given by: 
(4) N = ån(w, a, v)g(w, a, v).
Improvements in aggregate economic con-
ditions can be modeled as changes in the dis-
tribution function g such that more individuals
are concentrated over higher values of w, a, 
or v. In the first case (higher values of w), ag-
gregate employment can be expected to rise,
while in the second and third cases, employ-
ment can be expected to fall. In each case, any
reasonable measure of social welfare can be
expected to increase.
Note that, even in the absence of aggregate
uncertainty (i.e., a stationary distribution func-
tion g), the equilibrium of this economy will in
general feature flows of workers into and out of
employment (recall that individuals begin each
period by independently drawing a new realiza-
tion of (w, a, v) from the distribution g). Exam-
ples of such transitions are plotted in figure 3.
Keep in mind that, because financial markets
are absent, these transitions are typically associ-
ated with significant changes in personal living
standards. Two points deserve to be made here.
First, note that one cannot infer any change in
personal well-being simply on the basis of an
observed change in labor market status. Con-
sider, for example, a person who begins the
period at point A in figure 3. Suppose that at the
end of the period, we observe that the individ-
ual exits employment. Whether this person is
better or worse off clearly depends on the
change in economic circumstances that trig-
gered the transition. For example, a deteriora-
tion in the value of market time (point B) or an
improvement in the value of nonmarket activi-
ties (point C) may both trigger such a transition.
Second, note that these transitions are not the
direct cause of any change in living standards;
rather they represent the “rational” behavior of
individuals in response to exogenous changes
in economic circumstances. The following ex-
ample will illustrate this latter point.
Imagine that individuals in the economy
described above differ only with respect to their
employment opportunities w and that w > 0, 
so that everyone always has the option of work-
ing at a job that produces positive output (note:
w may be arbitrarily close to zero so that the
opportunity may not be particularly attractive).
Let F (w) denote the fraction of workers with a
job with a wage no better than w and assume
that workers independently draw a new wage
every period from the distribution F. Individuals
value nonmarket activities identically according
to v > 0, and we assume that each person has
zero nonlabor income; i.e., a = 0.
1  if  w ³ (e v – 1)a ; 
0  if  w < (e v – 1)a,
w,a,v
F I G U R E 3
Possible Changes in the Value
of Leisure and the Wage Rate
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Recall that the reservation wage is given by
wR = (e v – 1)a, so that in this example, wR = 0
since a = 0 (people cannot afford to be very
choosy here). Since w > 0 by assumption, it fol-
lows that everyone chooses to work in this
economy, and that, consequently, transitions
into and out of employment are absent. Judg-
ing by these aggregate labor market statistics,
the economy appears tranquil (low turnover)
and robust (high employment).
However, these statistics hide the fluctua-
tions in individual well-being that occur as peo-
ple find the return to their labor changing over
time. Some individuals may experience precipi-
tous wage declines as the demand for their
labor all but disappears (perhaps owing to the
arrival of a new technology that is not well-
matched to their skills). These unfortunate peo-
ple refuse to exit from employment (as they
arguably should in order to pursue relatively
more valuable nonmarket activities such as
retraining), since they must work in order to
eat; as such, they become a part of the “work-
ing poor.”
This equilibrium is inefficient relative to one
in which insurance markets (or some equiva-
lent institution) operated to alleviate individual
income risk. Recall that, at the beginning of
each period, an individual draws a new wage
according to the distribution F; the expected
utility payoff for the representative individual in
this world is given by: 
(5) EUA = ò0ln(w)dF(w).
In addition, note that per capita output is
given by y A = ò0wdF(w) with an employment
level N A = 1.
Consider now the allocation that would be
chosen by a social planner wishing to maxi-
mize the expected utility of the representative
individual (the same allocation would result in
a world with a perfectly functioning insurance
market). The social planner must choose a
reservation wage wR that determines who
works and who does not, along with a feasible
set of consumption levels for the employed y e
and nonemployed y n. Conditional on these
choices, the representative individual has an
expected utility payoff given by: 
(6) EU = [1 –F(wR )]ln(y e) + F(wR)[ln(y n) + v],
where F(wR) represents the probability of non-
employment. Assume that the planner chooses
(wR, y e, y n) in order to maximize EU subject to
the feasibility constraint (total consumption
cannot exceed total output): 
(7) [1 – F(wR)]y e + F(wR)y n  £ òwRwdF(w).
The reader can verify that the solution to
this problem entails a reservation wage that is
strictly positive, wR
* > 0, together with equal
consumption across labor market states,  y e
= y n = y* = òwR
* wdF(w). The expected utility de-
livered to the representative individual is EU *
= ln(y*) + F(wR
*)v. It can be easily demonstrated
that N * = 1 – F(wR
*) < NA (employment is lower
under the planner), y*< y A (output is lower un-
der the planner), and that EU * = ln(y*) + F (wR
*)v
> EUA (people are better off under the planner).
In addition, as time unfolds, note that individu-
als will generally experience transitions into
and out of employment under the allocation
chosen by the planner.
The availability of consumption insurance
means that people who temporarily find their
earnings capabilities severely diminished need
not waste valuable time engaged in very low
productivity tasks; time can instead be reallo-
cated to more productive nonmarket applica-
tions. Employment and market incomes in such
an environment are necessarily lower (relative
to a situation where everyone is compelled to
work), but this does not necessarily imply that
economic well-being is lower.
III. Unemployment
Recall that the CPS definition of an unemployed
person is someone who is both nonemployed
and actively searching for employment. Why
are there people in the economy whose eco-
nomic circumstances are such that they are
compelled to spend precious time looking for
buyers of labor willing to pay an acceptable
price for their particular job skill? It must be the
case that people have incomplete information
concerning the location of their best job oppor-
tunity, and that the job search activity generates
information whose expected return exceeds the
value of this foregone time spent in alternative
activities. Incomplete information of this sort is
likely to be a natural feature of any dynamic
economy in which changes in the structure of
technology and tastes randomly create, destroy,
and reallocate employment opportunities across
different sectors.
There are several ways in which one might
model the job search activity of nonemployed
workers. Here, we shall take a particularly
simple approach that is in keeping with the
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
Economic Review 1998 Q330
analysis developed earlier.7  Following the
setup above, assume that all individuals have
access to some employment opportunity in the
market sector. While some readers may view
such an assumption as a gross violation of real-
ity, our view is quite the opposite. In particu-
lar, note that we do not place any restriction
on the quality of potential employment oppor-
tunities, so that our setup does allow for the
possibility that there is a scarcity of what might
be considered to be “good” jobs.
As with the earlier analysis, assume that indi-
viduals are distributed in some exogenous
manner over the space (w, a, v). In that analy-
sis, it was implicitly assumed that individuals
had complete information about the location of
their best job opportunity (w), so that the job
search (and hence unemployment) in that envi-
ronment proved unnecessary. However, sup-
pose now that while individuals are endowed
with a job opportunity w at the beginning of
the period, they are generally aware that better
(and worse) prospects exist elsewhere. Assume
that these prospects p are distributed according
to a known distribution Q(x) = Pr[p £ x], where
Q¢ > 0. Job search is modeled as a random
draw from this distribution.
In particular, assume that an individual may
divert some given fraction of the period time
endowment 0 < (1 –  x ) < 1 toward job search.
(for simplicity, assume that such an action
necessitates the abandonment of the beginning-
of-period job opportunity). Following this exer-
tion of job search effort, the individual realizes
a new job opportunity p from the distribution 
Q and may at this stage choose to devote any
remaining time x toward employment or home
production activities.
Let us now determine the expected utility
payoff associated with the job search decision.
Once the new job opportunity is realized, the
individual faces a standard employment–
nonemployment decision and chooses a reser-
vation wage pR(a, v) that satisfies: 
(8) ln(xpR + a) = ln(a) + xv.
If the new employment opportunity offers a
wage p < pR, the individual will find it optimal
to spend any remaining time at home. With pR
so determined, the expected utility of undertak-
ing the search activity is given by: 
(9) l(a, v) = Q(pR)[ ln(a) + xv] 
+ òpRln(xp + a)dQ(p).
Here, Q(pR) is the probability that the new job
prospect is of an unacceptably low quality, in
which case the person earns a utility payoff
[ ln(a) + xv]. The term dQ(p) can be inter-
preted as the probability of locating a job with
wage p, which earns utility payoff ln(xp + a);
the second term in the right-hand side of the
expression above simply adds up the utility
payoff associated with each acceptable job
weighted by the probability of finding a job of
that particular quality.
In the earlier analysis, which abstracted from
unemployment, a reservation wage wR was
determined that partitioned the population into
employment and nonemployment; these two
groups we shall now refer to as “type-A” and
“type-B” individuals, respectively. Think of
type-A individuals as those who (given current
economic circumstances) prefer work to leisure
(i.e., w > wR ), while type-B individuals are
those who prefer leisure to work (i.e., w < wR).
With the option of job search available,
some type-A individuals may now choose to
abandon their current employment opportunity
in pursuit of a new (and hopefully better) one.
The return to work is given by ln(w + a), while
the return to search is given by l(a, v). Clearly,
the optimal strategy is to form a reservation
wage w¢ R satisfying: 
(10) ln(w¢ R + a) = l(a, v),
such that all type-A individuals with w > w¢ R
should choose to work full-time, while those
with w < w¢ R should abandon their current
employment opportunity in search of another.
It can be demonstrated that w¢ R ³ wR for type-
A individuals; i.e., the option of a search activ-
ity makes these people even more choosy
about their beginning-of-period employment
opportunity.
Likewise, a group of type-B individuals may
now choose to sacrifice some of their leisure
time to look for work (i.e., for a wage that dom-
inates their current employment opportunity).
As the return to leisure is given by ln(a) + v, the
optimal strategy for type-B individuals is to set a
reservation “leisure wage” of vR satisfying: 
(11) ln(a) +  vR = l(a, vR),
such that all type-B persons with v > vR should
choose full-time leisure, while those with v < vR
should devote some time to active job search.
n 7 The model that follows is closely related to that developed by
Burdett, Kiefer, Mortensen, and Neumann (1984); and Andolfatto and
Gomme (1996).
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Figure 4 plots the reservation wage functions
wR, w¢ R and vR for a given level of nonlabor
income.
In order to calculate the equilibrium level of
employment and unemployment, let us assume
that the CPS is undertaken at the end of each
period. To begin, it is clear that all type-A indi-
viduals with w > w¢ R would be classified as
employed, as these individuals work through-
out the period. As well, all type-B individuals
with v > vR would be classified as nonpartici-
pants, as these individuals engage in nonmar-
ket activities throughout the period. All remain-
ing individuals allocate at least some time to
search. However, not all of these individuals
would be classified as unemployed by the CPS.
In particular, all searchers who are successful at
finding a suitable job within the reference
period of the survey and work any amount of
positive hours would be classified as employed.
The unemployed are those who search for
work but are unsuccessful at obtaining a suit-
able job within the reference period of the
labor force survey. In terms of figure 5, the
unemployed would be those who find them-
selves in the shaded region of the parameter
space at the end of the period. 
How are the economic attributes (w, a, v)
related to individual labor market choices?
Recall the earlier analysis of employment and
nonemployment. In that model, conditional on
the level of nonlabor income a, the employed
tended to be those people with high (w/v)
ratios; i.e., those individuals whose productivity
in the labor market dominated their productiv-
ity in the home sector. In that model, the em-
ployment decision is a poor indicator of eco-
nomic well-being, as it depends (conditional on
a) primarily on the ratio (w/v), while economic
welfare depends on the levels of w and v.
What general inferences can be made about
unemployment and individual well-being?
According to the model of unemployment
developed above, there is a sense in which the
unemployed tend to be relatively disadvan-
taged (conditioning on the level of nonlabor
income). Being measured as unemployed for
the period indicates that, at some time in the
recent past, the available job opportunity w was
of poor quality and that the value of time spent
in alternative uses v was also of poor quality.
(Individuals with good qualityw’s tend to be
employed, while individuals with good
qualityv’s tend to be nonparticipants.) As eco-
nomic well-being depends (indirectly) on the
levels of w and v, it follows that choosing to
search (a prerequisite for being unemployed) is
associated with a low level of welfare.
Having said this, note that there may be
many individuals in the model who are em-
ployed and yet experience even lower levels of
welfare than the unemployed (even holding
equal the level of nonlabor income). Recall that
after a job search yields an employment oppor-
tunity that pays p, an individual is free to work
for wage p or spend the time at home earning
the “leisure wage” v. If the latter choice is
made, then the job search is deemed unsuc-
cessful and the person is classified as unem-
ployed. If the former choice is made, then the
F I G U R E 4
The Search Decision
F I G U R E 5
The Unemployment Decision
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person is classified as employed for the period.
Note that this work–leisure choice depends, as
before, primarily on the ratio (p/v), and so
whether the person chooses employment or
unemployment at this stage reveals very little
about the levels of p or v (and hence the level
of welfare).
For example, consider two individuals with
identical p’s and a’s, but with different v’s. It 
is conceivable that the person with the poor
home opportunity will at this stage choose
employment, while the person with the rela-
tively good home opportunity will choose not
to work (and therefore be measured as unem-
ployed). In this example, the unemployed per-
son is clearly better off than the employed
person, while both persons are worse off com-
pared to most other members of the population
who did not feel the need to search.
What about the relationship between the
level of nonhuman wealth a and unemploy-
ment? Consider two societies that are identical
in every respect except that one society gener-
ates all of its income from labor, while the
other is also endowed with a source of nonla-
bor income a > 0. What can be said about the
equilibrium level of unemployment and level 
of welfare in these two economies?
From the earlier analysis of employment 
and nonemployment, we know that there is 
no nonemployment (and hence no unemploy-
ment) in the economy with zero nonhuman
wealth. Individuals may still choose to search
and generate new job opportunities p, but
when a = 0 it turns out that pR = 0, so that indi-
viduals will choose to work at whatever new
prospect makes itself available (as long as p >
0). Thus, we observe paradoxically that the
wealthier economy will exhibit a higher meas-
ured rate of unemployment. There is a sense
here in which unemployment represents a “lux-
ury” that only very rich countries can afford.
Citizens of poor countries are compelled to
work (either in the market or at home) or die;
in either case, they are unlikely to be recorded
as being “unemployed” by the CPS.8
More generally, the model suggests an
ambiguous relationship between unemploy-
ment and wealth. The reason for this is as fol-
lows. First, from the condition determining vR,
one can demonstrate that vR is a decreasing
function of a. In other words, higher levels of
wealth have the effect of making leisure more
affordable; this effect leads to higher nonpartic-
ipation and hence less search activity (and
hence lower unemployment). Second, from the
condition that determines w¢ R, it appears that
w¢ R may either increase or decrease with higher
levels of wealth. On the one hand, a higher
level of nonlabor income may make an individ-
ual more willing to forego the hassles associ-
ated with job search. On the other hand, a
higher level of nonlabor income means that an
individual can better afford to engage in job
search activities. Which effect dominates de-
pends on the precise form of preferences, the
level of nonlabor income, and the distribution
of available job opportunities. If w¢ R is decreas-
ing in a, then people are less willing to search,
so that unemployment falls, reinforcing the par-
ticipation effect. In this case, unemployment
unambiguously declines as nonlabor income
rises. If w¢ R is increasing in a, then people are
more willing to search, leading to an increase
in unemployment, offsetting the participation
effect. The overall effect on unemployment
then depends on the relative strength of these
two effects.
Finally, a remark on the optimal level of
unemployment. With incomplete consumption
insurance markets, the equilibrium level of
unemployment will likely be too low. The rea-
son for this is similar to before: Individuals who
find themselves temporarily in dire straits are
compelled to work rather than search and/or
engage in other nonmarket activities. This basic
result calls into question the conventional wis-
dom which views unemployment as “idle” or
“wasted” resources.
IV. Conclusions
Economic theory asserts that living standards
(utility) ought to depend primarily on the level
of broadly defined consumption (including
leisure). The simple, yet in many ways plausi-
ble, model developed above demonstrated the
tenuous link between labor market choices and
economic well-being. Economic welfare was
shown to be linked indirectly to the level of
human capital in the market and at home, and
to sources of nonlabor income. These parame-
ters determine the individual’s ability to gener-
ate high consumption levels.
Labor market choices concerning whether to
be employed or nonemployed, however, in
general reflect the relative returns to engaging
in alternative activities, and hence are poor
indicators of the level of welfare.
n 8 One might also point out that there is likely very little reason for job
search activity in poor, stagnant economies (aside from migration to cities).
In such environments, the set of available employment opportunities is likely
very limited so that information concerning their location is readily available;
individuals face a standard employment–nonemployment decision.
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However, the decision to undertake labor
market search was shown to be correlated with
poor opportunities in the market and at home.
Since the extent of search activity and the level
of unemployment are obviously linked, there is
reason to believe that unemployed workers are
generally worse off in welfare terms relative to
that set of the population that appears content
with current market/home opportunities. How-
ever, it would be a mistake to infer that the un-
employed are the least well-off members of the
workforce. In particular, individuals who are
endowed with very poor human capital and no
outside source of income may be compelled to
work at jobs that others can afford to eschew;
these poorly endowed individuals comprise the
“working poor.”
Thus, while the unemployed tend to be dis-
advantaged relative to perhaps the majority of
the population, it does not necessarily follow
that they should constitute the primary target of
social policy (should redistribution policy be
deemed desirable). Furthermore, it does not
necessarily follow that the elimination of unem-
ployment would lead to an improvement in
their economic well-being. Whether a reduction
in unemployment is associated with an im-
provement in welfare would depend on the
particular change in economic circumstances
that altered the return to job search activities.
Unemployment may fall because of any number
of diverse reasons, for example: (1) an improve-
ment in the quality of labor market opportuni-
ties; (2) a deterioration in the distribution of
new job opportunities; (3) cutbacks in public
unemployment insurance (reductions in a); or
(4) the arrival of an oppressive regime that im-
poses “work camps” and bans job search activ-
ity.9 Clearly, not all of these examples would be
unambiguously associated with improvements
in overall social welfare.
The undue focus on unemployment as a
measure of economic performance and welfare
has contributed much mischief to discussions
concerning the design and implementation of
labor market (and monetary) policy. Through-
out the 1980s, for example, the Canadian
unemployment rate averaged about four per-
centage points higher than the United States,
after decades of close correspondence.10 This
event was widely portrayed as reflecting some
underlying malaise in the Canadian economy, a
belief that seemed to persist despite the fact
that real per capita income growth and employ-
ment rates in the two countries remained simi-
lar. Indeed, the Canadian economy even man-
aged to maintain a stable after-tax distribution
of income over this high-growth period, while
in the United States the income distribution
widened. Clearly, one must look deeper than
simple measures of labor market activity before
making definitive statements about economic
performance and well-being.11
n 9 See Eason (1957), who quotes from Pravda (January 31, 1954):
“In 1953, as in preceding years, there has been no unemployment [in the
Soviet Union].’’
n 10 See Andolfatto, Gomme, and Storer (1997); and Burtless (1997).
n 11 Rogerson (1997) makes a similar point concerning European
unemployment.
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